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Abstract 
Expanding access to financial services holds the promise to help reduce poverty and foster 
economic development. However, little is still known about the determinants of the outreach of 
financial systems across countries. Our study is the first attempt to employ a large panel of 
countries, several indicators of financial inclusion and a comprehensive set of bank competition 
measures to study the role of banking system structure as a determinant of cross-country variability 
in financial outreach for households. We use panel data from 83 countries over a 10-year period 
to estimate models with both country and time fixed effects.  We find that greater banking industry 
concentration is associated with more access to deposit accounts and loans, provided that the 
market power of banks is limited. We find evidence that countries in which regulations allow banks 
to engage in a broader scope of activities are also characterized by greater financial inclusion. Our 
results are robust to changes in sample, data, and estimation strategy and suggest that the degree 
of competition is an important aspect of inclusive financial sectors.   
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Introduction 
Greater financial development has been linked to economic development as well as the 
reduction of income inequality. However, most of the empirical cross-country literature on the 
impact of financial development focuses on financial depth, using measures such as total 
outstanding deposits and credit to the non-financial private sector (e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 
and Levine (2007)). Only recently have researchers turned their attention to questions of 
financial inclusion –the extent to which households and firms can access and make use of formal 
financial services (see Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2008) for a survey). 
 At the same time, the consolidation of banks around the globe in recent years and the 
increased scrutiny of banking regulation in the wake of the financial crisis have intensified the 
policy debates on the influence of concentration and competition in the banking industry on real 
sector outcomes (e.g., Beck and Degryse (2014)).1 Within this framework, an area of particular 
interest among researchers and policymakers has been the potential impact of financial market 
structure on access to finance. The traditional market power view argues that competition in the 
banking market reduces the cost of finance and increases the availability of financial services 
(e.g., Berger and Hannan (1998)). Interestingly, cross-country empirical research has focused 
almost entirely on access to finance by firms, a feature of the literature that may respond in part 
to the lack of sufficient and reliable aggregate level data on households until recently. Using data 
from a panel of 83 developed and developing countries, our study is the first one to explore the 
relationship between the structure of the banking industry and households’ financial inclusion. , 
Because measuring competition in the banking sector is challenging, we rely on a wide array of 
bank competition indicators that proxy for market contestability and market power and relate 
                                                          
1 For example, between 1998 and 2013, the percent of assets held by the largest five banks in the United States 
increased from 32 percent to 47 percent. 
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these competition indicators to several different measures of access to finance by individuals. We 
find that greater banking industry concentration is associated with more access to deposit 
accounts and loans, provided that the market power of banks (as measured by pricing over 
marginal cost) is limited.2 We find somewhat weaker evidence that countries in which 
regulations allow banks to engage in a broader scope of activities are also characterized by 
greater financial inclusion.  Thus, our results indicate that big banks are consistent with broad 
financial inclusion as long as the market remains contestable.  
Broad financial sector outreach is likely to be important for several reasons. For 
households, borrowing is an important way to cope with emergencies and to pay for household 
and social expenses such as water, health services and education (Peachey and Roe (2006)). 
Savings can also be an important way to smooth consumption from one month to the next and to 
cope with unexpected expenses.3 Hence, borrowing and saving may be welfare enhancing even if 
not always output-increasing. For poor households in particular, financial market imperfections 
(e.g., informational asymmetries, transaction costs) can lead to financial constraints due to a lack 
of collateral, credit histories and connections. Until recently however, due to the lack of data on a 
broad cross-section of countries, much of the research on financial outreach has been done at the 
micro level (see Karlan and Morduch (2009)) for a survey), and therefore the conclusions of the 
research may only be country or region specific.. Little is still known about the determinants of 
the breadth of financial systems across countries.  
                                                          
2 As we discuss further below, we do not find a strong positive correlation between banking industry concentration 
and market power. 
3 Studies show that poor households often seek specific, structured financial tools to achieve their savings goals and 
refute the old prejudices held that poor households lack the surpluses to save much (e.g., Ashraf et al. (2006b), Collins 
et al. (2009)). For example, Collins et al. (2009) study the financial lives of poor households and find a common 
pattern of intensive use of saving instruments but relatively small average balances. 
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In order to characterize banking sector outreach across countries, we rely on measures of 
actual use of deposit and credit services collected from the IMF’s Financial Access Survey. 
Specifically, we employ indicators on the number of borrowers, depositors, loan and deposit 
accounts per 1,000 adults. We interpret higher values of these measures as indicating the use of 
deposit and credit services by a greater share of the population and by clients with smaller 
savings and loan account balances. Our choice and interpretation of the measures follow that of 
Beck et al. (2007) but while the authors carry out their own survey at one point in time only, we 
benefit from a richer time-series data for a larger set of countries that allows us to explore the 
relation between different determinants and financial system outreach over time as well as 
exploit within-country variation of access to finance. We acknowledge that there are other 
banking services in addition to deposit-taking and lending (such as insurance services) as well as 
other financial providers beyond commercial banks, namely, microfinance institutions and 
cooperatives. These are all natural avenues for future research, however, our current focus on 
commercial banks has the advantage of providing specific policy implications. 
The link from market structure to degree of competition is not clear as highlighted by the 
long existing contestability literature (e.g., Baumol et al. 1982, Panzar and Rosse (1987), 
Molyneux et al. (1996), Philippatos (2007)). Specifically, the competitiveness of an industry 
cannot be measured by market structure indicators alone (such as the number of institutions, 
Herfindahl or other concentration indexes).  Rather, establishing the degree of effective banking 
competition requires a more comprehensive array of indicators, namely, contestability measures 
(entry and exit indicators) such as requirements for bank licenses and share of licenses denied as 
well as non-structural measures of competition (market power indicators). The market power 
indicator that we use is the Lerner index –a measure of pricing above marginal cost- for reasons 
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that we discuss at length in the next section. While the evidence on the relationship between 
banking concentration and access to finance yields mixed results, studies using measures of 
effective competition find that competition improves access. Our work incorporates the lessons 
from this literature when assessing the effects of banking competition on access and therefore 
distinguishes us from other empirical studies that rely exclusively on a single measure to proxy 
for market power.   
Our work is related to a well-developed literature on access to finance by firms. For 
example, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) show that more concentrated banking systems increase 
firms’ access to finance. This contrasts with Beck et al (2003) that finds for a panel of countries 
that bank concentration increases firms’ financing obstacles and decreases the likelihood of 
receiving bank finance with the effect being exacerbated by more restrictions on banks’ 
activities. Claessens and Laeven (2005) provides evidence for 16 countries that more competitive 
banking systems exert a positive effect on firms’ access to finance. Carbo-Valverde et al (2009) 
shows that the effect of banking sector competition on Spanish firms’ access to finance depends 
crucially on how competition is measured. Their results indicate a negative association between 
market power and access to finance when the Lerner index is used. However, when using 
measures of concentration, their findings are reversed; as do we, they also find a positive 
association between industry concentration and access to finance. The results from this literature 
therefore suggest that the structure of the banking system is an aspect of the overall financial 
system functioning that is worth analyzing in the context of household access to financial 
services. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First and foremost, it adds to the 
still evolving literature on financial inclusion in general and financial outreach for households in 
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particular. Efforts to examine how formal financial systems affect the poor remain inadequate 
with much of the action still revolving around country level studies which suffer from their own 
set of limitations -including very high costs of implementation and the concerns of whether 
results found in one specific socioeconomic environment can easily be applied to another. Only a 
few papers investigate the link for a large panel of countries but their emphasis lie on the effect 
of financial depth measures on inequality (see Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) for a review). 
We also add to the broader literature on banking sector competition and access to finance for 
firms. To our knowledge, we are the first study to employ a large panel of countries, several 
indicators of financial inclusion and a comprehensive set of bank competition measures to study 
the role of banking system structure as a determinant of cross-country variability in financial 
outreach for households. Our results are robust under a variety of tests and suggest that the 
degree of competition is an important aspect of inclusive financial sectors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
presents the econometric methodology. We provide the main results in Section 3 and present 
robustness tests in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Methods and Data 
In order to investigate the relationship between the structure of the banking industry and 
financial inclusion, we use data from an unbalanced panel of 83 countries over the years 2004 to 
2013. Our main specification explores the relationship between banking industry concentration 
and several different measures of access to deposit accounts and loans.  When studying the 
effects of banking system structure on access to finance, we need to control for other country 
circumstances that may be correlated with industry concentration but may also determine access 
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to finance. Otherwise, the incorrect conclusion that concentration is (or is not) important could 
be reached. Specifically, in the base specification, we estimate, 
 
INCLUSIONi,t = β1DEPTHi,t + β2GDPi,t +β3CONCENTRATIONi,t-1 + αi + λt + εi,t                  (1) 
 
where INCLUSIONi,t is one of seven different measures of access to either loan or deposit 
accounts in country i in year t, DEPTH is the natural log of financial depth, GDP is the natural 
log of real GDP per capita, and CONCENTRATION is the share of assets of either the top three 
banks or the top five banks, lagged by one year.  We use a lagged value of CONCENTRATION 
in the estimation to facilitate a causal interpretation;  αi and λt are country and year-specific fixed 
effects and εi,t is a mean-zero, normal disturbance term.  When INCLUSION is a measure of 
access to deposits, the financial depth measure that we use is M3/GDP; when INCLUSION is a 
measure of access to loans, the financial depth measure that we use is private credit/GDP.  This 
allows us to better match up a financial depth measure of loans or deposits with similar financial 
breadth measures.  In additional estimations, we also seek evidence of a non-linear relationship 
between CONCENTRATION and INCLUSION by including the square of 
CONCENTRATION.   
As we explain below, for a smaller sample of countries and years, we use alternative 
measures of the structure of the banking industry.  Specifically, we use measures of regulation of 
the banking industry that affect industry concentration: restrictions on banking activities 
(regulatory restrictions on banks’ involvement in securities, insurance, and real estate activities) 
and the fraction of entry applications denied.  Finally, we also use the Lerner index, a measure of 
market power in the banking industry based on pricing over marginal cost.  In supplementary 
estimations, we explore the relationship between these characteristics of industry structure and 
INCLUSION in similar specifications. 
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The country-specific effects capture characteristics of the country that do not change over 
the sample period.  This would include several institutional features of the economy that could be 
relevant to financial inclusion such as quality and availability of credit reporting as well as 
general institutional quality reflected in characteristics of the legal system.  The year-specific 
effect would account for temporary financial shocks that would be common to all countries.  The 
country and year fixed effects should also help us to control for the variation in the demand for 
financial services across countries or across time.  For example, the year fixed effect should 
control for macroeconomic shocks that are common across all countries that could affect the 
demand.  Similarly, the country fixed effect should control for country-specific characteristics 
that might influence demand for financial services that we do not include in our estimation. 
The interpretation of β3 is that it captures the marginal impact of banking industry 
concentration on financial inclusion, after controlling for financial depth and GDP per capita. In 
all our estimations, we consistently find that financial depth and the level of economic 
development are strongly and positively related to financial inclusion. The question we seek to 
answer in this study is more subtle: for a given level of financial development, what 
characteristics of the banking industry and banking regulation are associated with greater 
financial inclusion?  In other words, for a given financial depth, what factors are associated with 
greater financial breadth? 
The data used comes from three sources. Financial inclusion data is from the 
International Monetary Fund’s Financial Access Survey. Financial depth, GDP per capita, 
industry concentration ratios, and the Lerner index are from the World Bank’s Global Financial 
Development and World Development Indicators datasets. Both the industry concentration ratios 
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and the Lerner index are derived from Bankscope data. The regulatory measures are from Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2001). 
We use seven different measures of financial inclusion:  number of Depositors, 
Household Depositors, Household Deposit Accounts, Borrowers, Household Borrowers, Loan 
Accounts, and Household Loan Accounts.  All financial inclusion measures are stated per 1,000 
adults and reflect relationships with commercial banks. Note that Depositors, Borrowers, and 
Loan Accounts include financial services offered both to households and nonfinancial firms.   
None of these measures of financial inclusion are perfect. One issue is that they include 
deposit and loan relationships of both residents and non-residents of the reporting country. We 
attempt to mitigate concerns about countries that may have significantly more non-residents with 
banking relationships affecting our results by 1) estimating a country-specific effect, and 2) 
showing that our results are robust to removal of countries from the estimation sample that are 
considered to be off-shore financial centers. 
Another concern is that the data for Depositors, Borrowers, and Loan Accounts include 
financial services offered both to households and nonfinancial firms.  Thus, using these measures 
only allows us to make broad statements about financial inclusion and not statements specific to 
households and individual access to banking services.  Although using measures for Household 
Depositors and Household Borrowers may seem to resolve this issue, unfortunately, because of 
the way the data is reported to the IMF, if individuals have deposit or borrowing relationships 
with multiple banks, they are counted in the data multiple times.  The data for Household 
Deposit Accounts and Household Loan Accounts suffers from a similar problem:  even if a 
borrower or depositor has multiple accounts with the same bank, the data for Household Deposit 
Accounts and Household Loan Accounts reports all these accounts as separate accounts.  Thus, 
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although all measures are reported per 1,000 adults, given the presence of non-residents and also 
the potential for counting the same depositor or borrower multiple times, it is possible that all 
these variables take on values greater than 1,000. 
We take into account the characteristics of the data when we interpret our results and 
perform robustness checks.  Although the measures of financial inclusion are imperfect in 
different ways, they are all strongly correlated, with the correlation coefficients ranging from .50 
to .995.4  (See Table 1) 
Summary statistics for the data used appear in Table 2.  These summary statistics indicate 
that there is a great deal of variation in both the measures of financial inclusion as well as 
characteristics of the banking industry.  For example, the average number of Household 
Borrowers per 1,000 adults is 173, but the standard deviation is almost equally as large.  
Similarly, the banking industry is fairly concentrated with 82 percent of the assets being held by 
the five largest banks, on average.  However, the five bank asset concentration ratio also has a 
wide range, going from a low of 30 to a high of 100.  In the next section, we explore how the 
variation in banking industry characteristics are related to the variation in financial inclusion. 
 
3 Results 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of estimation of Equation 1 for deposit relationships (Table 3) 
and borrowing relationships (Table 4).  Table 3 reports results using three different measures of 
deposit relationships:  Depositors (columns 1 – 4), Household Depositors (columns 5 – 8), and 
Household Deposit Accounts (columns 9 – 12).   
                                                          
4 Beck et al. (2007) use similar data. 
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The results are consistent across all three measures of financial access.  First, as to be 
expected, financial depth and GDP per capita are both strongly positively correlated with deposit 
accounts.  Interestingly, after controlling for financial depth, industry concentration is positively 
associated with access to bank accounts.5  The first two columns for each measure of financial 
access examine the asset concentration of the largest three banks in the country and the last two 
columns examine the asset concentration of the largest five banks.  For both measures of 
concentration, there is strong evidence that the relationship is nonlinear, with a negative 
coefficient on the square of the concentration measure entering in all estimations in a statistically 
significant manner.  However, given the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, even when the 
industry concentration hits the maximum of 100 percent, the overall marginal effect of higher 
concentration is still positive. 
As we mentioned earlier, each measure of financial access has some imperfections, 
however, taken together, these results are consistent with a higher industry concentration being 
associated with greater access to deposit accounts by both firms and households.  The most 
straightforward measure of access to deposit accounts is used in the last four columns of Table 3, 
Household Deposit Accounts.  Although this measure could increase simply because the same 
household obtains more deposit accounts (e.g., an increase on the intensive margin), it is the 
most easy to interpret because it is not confounded by the potential double counting and non-
household financial access that are embedded in the other two measures.  The results in Column 
10 suggest that industry concentration does have a meaningful impact on financial access:  A one 
standard deviation increase in the three-bank concentration ratio is associated with an increase in 
Household Deposit Accounts of 565 or roughly one-third of a standard deviation.   
                                                          
5 Removing financial depth from the estimations in Tables 3 and 4 provides qualitatively similar results for industry 
concentration, but a worse fit overall for the estimation (lower R2). 
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Table 4 presents the results from similar estimations that use measures of access to loans 
as the dependent variable.  Although there are fewer statistically significant coefficients, these 
results are generally consistent with those reported in Table 3.  Overall, the results in Tables 3 
and 4 suggest that a banking industry characterized by higher asset concentrations at the largest 
banks is associated with greater financial inclusion. 
Although one possible interpretation of this result is that a less competitive banking 
industry provides greater financial inclusion, we note that industry concentration is only one 
measure of the competitiveness of the banking industry.  A banking industry with only a few 
large banks may still be “competitive” by other measures.  As mentioned in the introduction, a 
high degree of industry concentration does not necessarily imply that the market is not 
contestable, and this observation is evident in our data.  For example, a fixed effects regression 
explaining the Lerner index shows that industry concentration is positively and significantly 
related as one might expect if higher industry concentration is associated with less competition.  
However, the regression explains only four percent of the variation in the Lerner index, 
suggesting that industry concentration is only one dimension of the competitiveness of the 
banking market. 6   
To explore other measures of banking industry structure and competitiveness, we exploit 
data from Barth et al. (2001) on bank regulation.  Specifically, we use an index on restrictions on 
banking activities to capture the scope of activities in which banks are legally permitted to 
engage.  The higher this index is, the more restrictions imposed by regulators and the smaller the 
scope of banking activities.  Although theoretically greater restrictions on banking activities 
could result in smaller banks, this measure of the structure of the banking industry is not 
                                                          
6 Results for this and any other estimation discussed in the paper but not reported in detail are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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significantly correlated with asset concentration.  We also use the fraction of entry applications 
to the banking industry that are denied as an alternative measure of industry competition.  The 
greater the fraction of applications that are denied, the higher the barriers to entry and the less 
competitive the industry.  Finally, we also employ a third measure of industry competitiveness, 
the Lerner index, in estimations similar to those presented in Tables 3 and 4.  The Lerner index is 
a measure of pricing over marginal cost so a higher Lerner is associated with greater market 
power of the individual banks and less competition in the banking industry. 
A drawback to using the banking regulation measures from Barth et al. (2001) is that 
their use dramatically reduces the sample size.  Thus, a fixed effects estimation could be very 
costly in terms of degrees of freedom.  Fortunately, Hausman tests indicate that a random effects 
specification is appropriate at the 5 percent significance level for this smaller data set.  Even so, 
the sample sizes for the deposit account estimations similar to those in Table 3 are too small to 
generate consistent statistically significant results for either the financial depth measure or these 
additional measures of industry structure and competitiveness; we do not have much confidence 
in these results and do not report them in detail. 
We do have slightly larger sample sizes for estimations using borrowing-based measures 
of financial inclusion.  Table 5 reports the results when the alternative measures of industry 
structure are used to explain access to bank loans.  Although none of them are significant in 
explaining Borrowers or Household Borrowers, there is some evidence that more restrictions on 
banking activities is associated with less access to Loan Accounts and Household Loan 
Accounts.  Furthermore, the coefficients on entry applications denied suggests that a less 
competitive banking industry that results from greater barriers to entry also is associated with 
fewer Loan Accounts and Household Loan Accounts.  That result is also supported by the 
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coefficient on the Lerner index in the estimation of Household Loan Accounts which suggests 
too that lower levels of competition (higher Lerner) is associated with fewer Household Loan 
Accounts.   
In total, these results provide some insight into possible reasons for the positive 
correlations between industry concentration and financial inclusion that appear in Tables 3 and 4.  
Specifically, the fact that greater bank scope is associated with greater financial inclusion 
suggests that the economies of scale associated with larger banks may benefit greater financial 
access.  However, that benefit only accrues when the banking sector retains some 
competitiveness. 
To investigate that interpretation further, we test it directly by supplementing the 
estimations in Table 3 with the Lerner index and its interaction with industry concentration.7  If 
our reasoning above is correct, the interaction term between the Lerner index and industry 
concentration should be negative:  when the banking industry is not competitive (higher Lerner 
index), greater industry concentration has a negative impact on financial access.  Focusing again 
on the estimations for Household Deposit Accounts (column 5 of Table 6), the estimated 
coefficients suggest that greater industry concentration negatively impacts financial inclusion 
when the Lerner index is greater than .41.  A value of .41 for the Lerner index is the 90th 
percentile for the estimation sample.  Conversely, the results also suggest that decreases in 
competitiveness (increases in the Lerner index) are associated with lower rates of financial 
inclusion when the three bank asset concentration ratio exceeds 71 percent, or about the median 
for the estimation sample. 
                                                          
7 We also examined the results in Table 2 in a similar way.  As before, there were only a few significant coefficients 
on the main variables of interest.  Those that were significant were consistent with the interpretation we provide for 
Table 5. 
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These results are broadly consistent with the idea that larger banks with greater scope can 
aid financial inclusion, provided that the banking industry retains some level of competitiveness.  
Although we cannot test this directly, it suggests the sensible result that economies of scale are 
beneficial, up to the point at which they are associated with a severe lack of competition.  
Interestingly, there is not a strong association between the Lerner index and industry 
concentration.  In the sample used to estimate the results discussed above (column 5 of Table 6), 
there are 26 observations with a Lerner index above .41.  The three bank asset concentration ratio 
associated with those observations has an average of 74 percent, but a range of 37 to 100.  These 
numbers are only slightly larger than those for the remaining observations with a Lerner index 
below .41 (average of 70 with a range of 20 to 100). 
For a subset of developing countries in our sample, the IMF’s Financial Access Survey 
also provides the number of mobile money accounts per 1,000 adults.  These are accounts with 
resident mobile money service providers and are primarily accessed by mobile phones.  
Interestingly, when we use this as our measure of financial inclusion in this smaller sample, we 
find that financial depth is negatively related to increased use of mobile money accounts, 
suggesting that this type of financial access may be filling a gap in a less financially developed 
economy.  Furthermore, bank concentration is negatively related to mobile money accounts, 
consistent with this type of financial service being a substitute for commercial bank accounts.  
While the small sample size prohibits us from drawing strong conclusions from this result, it 
does give a more complete picture of financial access.  Our results suggest that bigger banks may 
be consistent with greater access to bank services, but in the absence of a well-developed 
financial sector, individuals seek access to financial services offered by non-banks. 
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4 Robustness Checks 
We next conduct a number of robustness checks. In this section we describe estimations that 
allow us to determine that our results are robust to 1) changes in the sample, 2) considering the 
possibility of measurement error in the concentration and competition measures, 3) using an 
alternative data source for industry concentration data, and 4) examining differences in financial 
inclusion and competition rather than levels. 
We start by exploring how changes in the sample would affect our results and remove 
countries from the estimation sample that are considered off-shore financial centers (OFCs). 
OFCs are jurisdictions that oversee a disproportionate level of financial activity by non-residents. 
Given that our access to finance measures include both residents and non-residents of the 
reporting country, distortions in these measures can be severe for OFCs. In order to classify a 
country as an OFC in our sample, we use two different classifications.  One classification is from 
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) and a second classification is 
from Rose and Spiegel (2007).  Rose and Spiegel (2007) produces a larger set of OFCs; the 
countries classified by the FFIEC as OFCs are a subset of the Rose and Spiegel countries.8 We 
also develop a third sample for robustness checks that removes OECD countries because the 
depth of their financial systems may also cause these countries to skew the results.  In total, we 
construct three samples for our sensitivity analysis, 1) exclude OFCs using the FFIEC definition 
only, 2) exclude OFCs as defined in Rose and Spiegel (2007), and 3) remove OECD countries 
from the sample.  Fortunately, our original estimation sample did not contain many observations 
from countries considered to be OFCs and removing them from the sample does not materially 
                                                          
8 Rose and Spiegel (2007) build their list of OFCs based on three sources (which have significant overlap), i) the 
“Report of the Working Group on Offshore Centres of the Financial Stability Forum, ii) Countries and Territories 
with Offshore Financial Centers from Errico and Musalem (1999) and iii) the “International and Offshore Financial 
Centers” from IMF (2004). Authors impose further that the OFC hosts at least $10 million in total assets.  
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change our results.  Similarly, removing OECD countries from the sample also generates similar 
results to those reported in Tables 3 and 4, with more banking system concentration exerting a 
positive effect on access to finance as long as the market remains competitive.   
We also investigate whether estimating the measures of concentration and competition 
with error affects our results. We do this by using the rank order of the concentration and 
competition measures rather than the variables themselves as independent variables. Results 
replicating Tables 3 and 4 using rank values are reported in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 (lowest 
value is given a rank of 1). Neither using the rank order of asset concentration ratios and that of 
the Lerner index alter our initial findings. Results are actually strengthened in the case of 
borrowing measures of access to finance. Results for the interaction of the Lerner index and asset 
concentration ratios are also robust to using ranks of both measures.  
As a subsequent robustness test, we investigate whether our specific measures of banking 
system concentration affect the results. So far, we have used the share of assets of either the top 
three banks or the top five banks from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development 
Indicators dataset constructed from Bankscope data. Alternative measures of industry 
concentration for a smaller sample of countries is available from the Barth et al. (2001) data.  
This data is based on regulators’ responses to a survey and contains a measure of industry 
concentration based on assets as well as one based on deposits.9 This too confirms our initial 
results that concentration and competition in the banking system matter for improved access to 
all forms of financial services. (See Appendix Table 3.) 
Although omitted variables should not be a major concern given our model specification, 
as an additional robustness check we estimate a variation of the specifications reported in Table 
                                                          
9 In the  2011 survey, regulators in each of the reporting countries were asked:  “Of commercial banks in your 
country, what percent of total deposits (assets) was held by the five largest banks at the end of 2008, 2009 and 2010? 
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6 that uses the first difference of financial inclusion and the first difference of asset 
concentration..  We interact the difference of asset concentration with the level of market power 
as measured by the Lerner index on the idea that the difference in concentration should matter 
more when banks have more market power (i.e., a difference-in-difference approach.)  The 
results are reported in Appendix Table 4. Once again, these results generally confirm that bank 
size has a positive effect on access to finance as long as banks do not have too much market 
power.10  
 
5 Conclusion 
Using a large cross-section of countries, our study offers new evidence on the relationship 
between the structure of the banking industry and financial inclusion for individuals.  We find 
that greater banking industry concentration is associated with more access to deposit accounts 
and loans, provided that the market power of banks is limited.  We find somewhat weaker 
evidence that countries in which regulations allow banks to engage in a broader scope of 
activities are also characterized by greater financial inclusion. These relationships control for the 
effects of overall economic and financial sector development, do not depend on the particular 
measure of access to finance used, and are robust to a number of sensitivity tests. Thus, our 
results indicate that big banks are consistent with broad financial inclusion as long as the market 
remains contestable. 
                                                          
10 We also attempted some additional specifications, but data availability dramatically reduced the sample size and 
we were unable to obtain statistically significant results.  Specifically, we used market capitalization as an 
alternative measure of financial development and also attempted to include access to finance by firms and the 
percent of assets in government-owned banks as additional independent variables.  Firm access to finance could 
affect financial inclusion via a trickle-down effect that boosts the demand for labor and reduces poverty. (Gine and 
Townsend (2004), Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2007)) Additionally, a large presence of state-owned banks may also 
be indicative of a non-competitive banking sector. (Barth et al (2004), Berger, Hasan and Klapper (2004). 
Unfortunately, these efforts results in very few observations (between 20 and 80) and we were unable to obtain 
statistically significant coefficients for many of the variables.  . 
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Of course, there may be other reasons to limit the concentration in the banking industry 
and keep banks smaller, such as the potential threat to financial stability that very large banks 
may pose.  However, our work suggests that a tradeoff in reducing concentration in the banking 
industry may be a reduction in economies of scale that help to increase financial inclusion.   
An important caveat is that our findings do not give insight on all the channels through 
which increased concentration and competition may affect the role of the financial sector in 
fostering access to finance for individuals. In particular, we did not investigate across countries 
the relationship between direct measures of the cost of financial intermediation, such as net 
interest margins, and our measure of competition (although that does capture the degree to which 
banks pass input costs on to output costs). Although the fixed effects estimation controls for 
fixed country characteristics that affect financial inclusion in a very general way, we do not 
explore specifically all possible measures of countries’ characteristics, including institutional 
aspects that may explain these findings. That is an avenue for future research.  Nevertheless, our 
results shed some important insights on how concentration and competition in the banking sector 
can affect access to external financing. 
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Table 1:  Correlation Matrix 
 
   Household    Household 
 Depositors Household Depositors 
Deposit 
Accounts Borrowers Household Borrowers 
Loan 
Accounts 
Loan 
Accounts 
         
Depositors 1       
Household Depositors 0.9651 1      
Household Deposit Accounts 0.8756 0.9344 1     
Borrowers 0.7356 0.7043 0.8077 1    
Household Borrowers 0.6955 0.6922 0.8217 0.9951 1   
Loan Accounts 0.6431 0.7861 0.5063 0.8579 0.8564 1  
Household Loan Accounts 0.5774 0.7641 0.5027 0.8603 0.8752 0.9932 1 
 
All correlations are significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean SD Min Max #observations 
Borrowers 181 204 0 1125 594 
Household Borrowers 173 159 1 788 292 
Loan Accounts 325 309 0 2323 531 
Household Loan Accounts 317 304 0 1951 352 
Depositors 480 555 0 3368 513 
Household Depositors 425 476 1 3342 254 
Household Deposit Accounts 1242 1437 1 7776 310 
ln(private credit/GDP) 3.31 0.86 0.06 5.31 594 
ln(Real GDP/capita) 7.88 1.43 4.97 11.01 594 
Three Bank Asset Concentration Ratio 73.58 19.46 21.70 100.00 594 
Five Bank Asset Concentration Ratio 82.31 15.32 30.53 100.00 500 
Restrictions on Banking Activities 8.02 2.03 3.00 12.00 96 
Fraction of Entry Applications Denied 0.16 0.25 0.00 1.00 69 
Lerner 0.29 0.16 -0.59 0.94 512 
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Table 3:  Commerical Bank Concentration and Access to Bank Accounts         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Depositors Household Depositors Household Deposit Accounts 
                          
LN(M3/GDP) 100.8*** 101.3*** 119.5*** 94.18*** 224.8*** 237.7*** 225.6*** 236.5*** 250.3*** 270.2*** 460.6*** 430.3*** 
 (35.58) (33.25) (36.87) (36.00) (59.02) (53.55) (63.67) (60.37) (94.20) (90.44) (117.4) (113.6) 
LN(GDP/capita) 271.8*** 266.0*** 273.6*** 264.0*** 325.2*** 351.8*** 338.9*** 402.3*** 978.1*** 987.2*** 1171*** 1105*** 
 (62.74) (58.63) (65.57) (63.40) (95.28) (86.49) (100.7) (96.54) (217.5) (208.6) (250.0) (241.8) 
% assets top three banks 3.613*** 27.51***   3.152*** 32.23***   2.208 33.45***   
 (0.593) (3.059)   (0.893) (4.437)   (1.389) (6.640)   
(%assets top three)^2  
-
0.164***    
-
0.203***    
-
0.225***   
  (0.0206)    (0.0305)    (0.0469)   
%assets top five banks   6.645*** 29.65***   7.470*** 39.61***   7.747*** 52.57*** 
   (0.803) (4.712)   (1.166) (7.451)   (1.600) (11.11) 
(%assets top five)^2    
-
0.154***    
-
0.221***    
-
0.300*** 
    (0.0312)    (0.0507)    (0.0737) 
             
Observations 513 513 408 408 254 254 207 207 310 310 263 263 
R-squared 0.342 0.426 0.435 0.474 0.325 0.447 0.447 0.507 0.372 0.425 0.441 0.481 
Number of countries 73 73 64 64 41 41 37 37 45 45 39 39 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country and year fixed effects included.  Bank concentration ratios lagged one period.  Annual 
data, 2004 – 2013.  Measure of financial access is per 1,000 adults 
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Table 4:  Commercial Bank Concentration and Access to Loans     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Borrowers Household Borrowers 
                  
LN(Private Credit/GDP) 50.18*** 50.55*** 78.24*** 79.00*** 126.1*** 128.3*** 146.3*** 145.5*** 
 (10.25) (10.26) (11.59) (11.63) (14.45) (14.48) (17.10) (17.08) 
LN(GDP/capita) 139.6*** 139.0*** 164.1*** 163.4*** 88.85*** 92.42*** 96.39*** 101.1*** 
 (29.02) (29.03) (30.49) (30.51) (33.58) (33.57) (36.57) (36.67) 
% assets top three banks 0.397 1.869   -0.355 2.557   
 (0.241) (1.583)   (0.313) (1.951)   
(%assets top three)^2  -0.00986    -0.0196   
  (0.0105)    (0.0130)   
%assets top five banks   1.103*** -0.743   1.202** 4.730* 
   (0.326) (2.358)   (0.473) (2.699) 
(%assets top five)^2    0.0117    -0.0230 
    (0.0148)    (0.0173) 
         
Observations 594 594 500 500 292 292 255 255 
R-squared 0.369 0.370 0.430 0.431 0.558 0.562 0.606 0.609 
Number of countries 83 83 73 73 48 48 44 44 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country and year fixed effects included.  Bank concentration ratios lagged one period.  Annual 
data, 2004 – 2013.  Measure of financial access is per 1,000 adults 
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Table 4 (cont.):  Commercial Bank Concentration and Access to Loans     
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Loan Accounts Household Loan Accounts 
                  
LN(Private Credit/GDP) 198.5*** 201.8*** 236.3*** 236.0*** 238.9*** 240.4*** 267.7*** 266.9*** 
 (35.77) (35.74) (42.56) (42.59) (41.28) (41.25) (48.06) (48.05) 
LN(GDP/capita) 289.3*** 294.3*** 304.0*** 306.3*** 263.5*** 260.7*** 246.8*** 248.4*** 
 (73.17) (73.06) (86.47) (86.60) (79.34) (79.28) (88.33) (88.30) 
% assets top three banks -0.0516 6.945*   -0.549 5.690   
 (0.704) (4.083)   (0.784) (4.906)   
(%assets top three)^2  -0.0482*    -0.0427   
  (0.0277)    (0.0331)   
%assets top five banks   2.249** 7.085   1.534 10.14 
   (0.983) (7.236)   (1.038) (7.847) 
(%assets top five)^2    -0.0312    -0.0552 
    (0.0462)    (0.0499) 
         
Observations 531 531 437 437 352 352 302 302 
R-squared 0.210 0.215 0.243 0.243 0.239 0.243 0.271 0.275 
Number of countries 81 81 70 70 51 51 47 47 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country and year fixed effects included.  Bank concentration ratios lagged one period.  Annual 
data, 2004 – 2013.  Measure of financial access is per 1,000 adults 
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Table 5:  Access to commercial bank loans and 
regulation           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Borrowers Household Borrowers Loan Accounts Household Loan Accounts 
                          
LN(Private Credit/GDP) 77.10*** 47.49* 58.72*** 80.71*** 49.31* 146.6*** 113.4*** 87.27** 187.2*** 102.3*** 120.8** 261.2*** 
 (25.85) (26.71) (11.31) (23.15) (25.68) (16.06) (30.75) (42.22) (31.67) (33.11) (59.85) (40.12) 
LN(GDP/capita) 69.46*** 85.49*** 88.11*** 43.63*** 69.64*** 32.39** 93.88*** 128.4*** 84.06*** 81.85*** 83.01*** 41.06 
 (16.30) (16.74) (12.23) (15.06) (18.41) (14.89) (21.74) (23.34) (22.66) (23.11) (31.78) (28.89) 
Restrictions on Banking 
Activities 2.335   -1.500   -15.62*   -23.95**   
 (4.491)   (5.611)   (8.393)   (9.725)   
Fraction Entry Applications 
Denied  25.71   20.61   -119.9*   -222.9**  
  (30.60)   (34.21)   (71.52)   (106.0)  
Lerner Index   8.200   -18.50   -65.37   -185.1* 
   (24.32)   (32.61)   (85.29)   (102.8) 
             
Observations 96 69 512 51 39 245 94 63 440 67 44 282 
Number of countries 65 54 70 38 30 38 64 52 65 44 36 40 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Country and year random effects included 
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Table 6:  Concentration, Competition and Deposits      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Depositors 
Household 
Depositors Household Deposit Accounts 
              
LN(M3/GDP) 88.27** 90.15** 217.9** 223.7** 431.0*** 443.5*** 
 (40.03) (43.02) (83.81) (98.43) (129.1) (133.0) 
LN(GDP/capita) 351.3*** 374.5*** 469.7*** 484.7*** 1076*** 1220*** 
 (77.93) (87.72) (140.7) (165.9) (241.8) (261.5) 
% assets top three banks 6.703***  10.36***  12.75***  
 (0.996)  (1.649)  (2.394)  
% assets top three banks*lerner -9.947***  -22.85***  -31.28***  
 (2.969)  (5.208)  (7.249)  
lerner 695.7*** 779.5** 1956*** 1236** 2233*** 1599** 
 (223.2) (346.6) (430.1) (574.2) (570.2) (729.4) 
%assets top five banks  9.488***  10.95***  13.85*** 
  (1.187)  (1.764)  (2.603) 
%assets top five banks*lerner  -9.990**  -14.08**  -22.75** 
  (4.073)  (6.858)  (8.883) 
       
Observations 436 374 217 182 264 244 
R-squared 0.389 0.463 0.409 0.482 0.443 0.468 
Number of countries 61 58 31 31 34 33 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Country and year fixed effects included. 
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Appendix Table 1:  Using Rank Order of Concentration Ratio, Deposits  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Depositors 
          
LN(M3/GDP) 100.3*** 109.8*** 137.9*** 112.2*** 
 (36.33) (35.17) (38.68) (39.03) 
LN(GDP/capita) 262.2*** 259.5*** 253.3*** 243.5*** 
 (64.01) (61.90) (68.50) (67.66) 
Rank of % assets top three banks 0.0703*** 0.380***   
 (0.0164) (0.0581)   
(Rank of %assets top three)^2  
-
0.000113***   
  (2.03e-05)   
Rank of %assets top five banks   0.132*** 0.372*** 
   (0.0225) (0.0794) 
(Rank of %assets top five)^2    
-
0.000109*** 
    (3.47e-05) 
     
Observations 513 513 408 408 
R-squared 0.314 0.360 0.382 0.400 
Number of countries 73 73 64 64 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Country and year fixed effects.  Similar to specifications reported in Table 3 except rank of 
industry concentration used, with lowest concentration given rank of 1. 
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Appendix Table 1 (cont.):  Using Rank Order of Concentration Ratio, Deposits     
  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Household Depositors Household Deposit Accounts 
                  
LN(M3/GDP) 225.5*** 221.6*** 246.1*** 202.6*** 241.3** 251.5*** 473.4*** 395.0*** 
 (60.21) (57.76) (67.36) (68.40) (97.48) (94.70) (125.6) (128.1) 
LN(GDP/capita) 328.7*** 319.3*** 306.6*** 327.4*** 945.5*** 1024*** 1106*** 1127*** 
 (97.26) (93.32) (106.5) (105.0) (226.4) (220.7) (267.7) (264.5) 
Rank of % assets top three banks 0.0515** 0.420***   0.0192 0.512***   
 (0.0253) (0.0891)   (0.0416) (0.132)   
(Rank of %assets top three)^2  -0.000136***    -0.000189***   
  (3.17e-05)    (4.80e-05)   
Rank of %assets top five banks   0.159*** 0.493***   0.166*** 0.618*** 
   (0.0358) (0.136)   (0.0487) (0.190) 
(Rank of %assets top five)^2    -0.000162**    -0.000224** 
    (6.37e-05)    (9.13e-05) 
         
Observations 254 254 207 207 295 295 248 248 
R-squared 0.297 0.357 0.381 0.405 0.354 0.393 0.401 0.418 
Number of countries 41 41 37 37 43 43 37 37 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Country and year fixed effects.  Similar to specifications reported in Table 3 except rank of 
industry concentration used, with lowest concentration given rank of 1. 
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Appendix Table 2:  Using Rank Order of Concentration Ratio, loans      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Borrowers Household Borrowers 
                  
LN(Private Credit/GDP) 49.80*** 52.14*** 79.83*** 79.09*** 126.7*** 128.7*** 144.0*** 138.2*** 
 (10.24) (10.24) (11.63) (11.70) (14.44) (14.45) (17.39) (17.14) 
LN(GDP/capita) 139.5*** 138.7*** 161.8*** 163.0*** 90.00*** 91.24*** 88.11** 107.8*** 
 (29.04) (28.91) (30.40) (30.47) (33.55) (33.46) (36.65) (36.48) 
Rank of % assets top three banks 0.00964 0.0649***   -0.0119 0.0426   
 (0.00640) (0.0248)   (0.00830) (0.0363)   
(Rank of %assets top three)^2  -2.03e-05**    -1.97e-05   
  (8.82e-06)    (1.28e-05)   
Rank of %assets top five banks   0.0272*** 0.0481   0.0196 0.175*** 
   (0.00783) (0.0324)   (0.0119) (0.0523) 
(Rank of %assets top five)^2    -9.26e-06    -7.14e-05*** 
    (1.39e-05)    (2.34e-05) 
         
Observations 594 594 500 500 292 292 255 255 
R-squared 0.368 0.375 0.430 0.431 0.559 0.564 0.598 0.617 
Number of cnum 83 83 73 73 48 48 44 44 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Country and year fixed effects.  Similar to specifications reported in Table 4 except rank of 
industry concentration used, with lowest concentration given rank of 1. 
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Appendix Table 2 (cont.):  Using Rank Order of Concentration Ratio, loans     
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
  Loan Accounts Household Loan Accounts 
                  
LN(Private Credit/GDP) 198.7*** 199.4*** 237.4*** 229.8*** 239.1*** 237.9*** 268.9*** 262.3*** 
 (36.20) (36.04) (43.31) (43.09) (41.26) (41.22) (48.18) (48.35) 
LN(GDP/capita) 285.4*** 294.6*** 290.4*** 312.7*** 264.7*** 261.2*** 244.5*** 238.7*** 
 (74.37) (74.15) (87.99) (87.79) (79.34) (79.28) (88.48) (88.44) 
Rank of % assets top three banks -0.00283 0.135**   -0.0181 0.0846   
 (0.0196) (0.0655)   (0.0214) (0.0797)   
(Rank of %assets top three)^2  -5.15e-05**    -3.85e-05   
  (2.33e-05)    (2.88e-05)   
Rank of %assets top five banks   0.0481* 0.293***   0.0290 0.169 
   (0.0257) (0.102)   (0.0263) (0.107) 
(Rank of %assets top five)^2    -0.000116**    -6.56e-05 
    (4.64e-05)    (4.86e-05) 
         
Observations 521 521 427 427 352 352 302 302 
R-squared 0.202 0.211 0.232 0.245 0.239 0.244 0.268 0.274 
Number of cnum 80 80 69 69 51 51 47 47 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Country and year fixed effects.  Similar to specifications reported in Table 4 except rank of 
industry concentration used, with lowest concentration given rank of 1. 
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Appendix Table 3: Bank Concentration and Bank Loans, alternative data source     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Borrowers Household Borrowers 
                  
LN(Private Credit/GDP) 49.72* 39.90 56.99** 40.53 83.43*** 68.43** 92.01*** 71.23** 
 (27.01) (27.39) (27.04) (29.09) (31.30) (31.97) (31.01) (34.95) 
LN(GDP/capita) 82.12*** 85.95*** 78.04*** 84.26*** 51.30*** 52.96*** 46.19*** 51.38*** 
 (17.43) (17.52) (17.40) (17.85) (18.08) (17.82) (17.79) (18.12) 
%assets top five banks 0.898* 3.474*   1.101* 3.903*   
 (0.512) (1.935)   (0.610) (2.199)   
(%assets top five)^2  -0.0228    -0.0288   
  (0.0166)    (0.0213)   
%deposits top five banks   0.932* 2.951*   0.849* 2.747 
   (0.480) (1.566)   (0.493) (1.672) 
(%deposits top five)^2    -0.0192    -0.0190 
    (0.0142)    (0.0160) 
         
Observations 92 92 93 93 47 47 48 48 
Number of countries 61 61 61 61 34 34 34 34 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Country and year random effects included.  Replicates estimations in Table 4 but uses estimates 
of bank concentration from survey of bank regulators (from Barth et al.).  Results in smaller sample, especially for deposits (not shown). 
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Appendix Table 3 (cont.): Bank Concentration and Bank Loans, alternative data source    
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Loan Accounts Household Loan Accounts 
                  
LN(Private Credit/GDP) 110.3** 71.41 112.0** 68.59 111.8** 71.58 111.5** 71.68 
 (46.78) (45.24) (45.64) (44.86) (55.04) (53.39) (54.82) (54.67) 
LN(GDP/capita) 112.0*** 124.1*** 112.6*** 126.9*** 102.0*** 115.0*** 103.8*** 116.4*** 
 (27.12) (26.13) (26.67) (25.79) (29.93) (28.84) (29.86) (29.13) 
%assets top five banks 1.560 17.70***   2.870** 16.23***   
 (1.085) (4.169)   (1.163) (4.377)   
(%assets top five)^2  -0.126***    -0.112***   
  (0.0325)    (0.0361)   
%deposits top five banks   2.213** 14.07***   2.972*** 11.83*** 
   (0.989) (3.349)   (1.084) (3.607) 
(%deposits top five)^2    -0.0972***    -0.0774** 
    (0.0269)    (0.0305) 
         
Observations 88 88 90 90 62 62 62 62 
Number of countries 58 58 58 58 40 40 40 40 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Country and year random effects included.  Replicates estimations in Table 4 but uses estimates 
of bank concentration from survey of bank regulators (from Barth et al.).  Results in smaller sample, especially for deposits (not shown). 
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Appendix Table 4:  Difference in Deposit Accounts and Difference in Concentration    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Difference in depositors 
Difference in Household 
Depositors Difference in Household Deposit Accounts 
              
LN(M3/GDP) -5.944 -11.97 -0.000301 -27.83 -52.95*** -62.46*** 
 (8.711) (8.886) (15.59) (18.96) (17.37) (18.98) 
LN(GDP/capita) 0.945 2.217 9.758* 10.75 14.93* 11.88 
 (3.481) (3.810) (5.249) (7.509) (7.988) (9.349) 
D.% assets top three banks 11.84***  21.28***  24.63***  
 (0.977)  (1.322)  (2.191)  
D.% assets top three banks*lerner -30.68***  -53.68***  -61.85***  
 (3.457)  (4.225)  (7.049)  
lerner 25.08 9.479 7.653 -106.2 -85.26 -132.5 
 (29.13) (29.96) (60.86) (80.00) (78.82) (89.94) 
D.% assets top five banks  16.64***  21.54***  23.16*** 
  (1.122)  (1.641)  (2.412) 
D.% assets top five banks*lerner  -53.00***  -79.29***  -74.59*** 
  (5.489)  (9.795)  (13.20) 
Observations 374 310 180 142 231 210 
R-squared 0.322 0.461 0.629 0.624 0.402 0.379 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Includes year, but not country specific fixed effects      
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